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RESPONSE
COOPERATIVE INSTITUTIONS IN
CULTURAL COMMONS
Gregg P. Maceyt
This Response critically evaluates Elinor Ostrom's InstitutionalAnalysis
and Developmentframework and points to some of the challenges of adaptingit
to study patent pools, open source software groups, and other "cultural"as
opposed to natural commons. Few have done more than Ostrom to advance the
study of institutions, and no approach offers more insight into the structure of
a common-pool resource or its management. But beyond Ostrom's considerable
descriptive endeavor and rebuke of "thin" rational choice arguments such as
the tragedy of the commons lies a difficult and as yet unfinished enterprise: the
study of institutional change. The hazards of applying her framework to cultural commons, which include avoidingfunctionalist explanations, attending
to the dynamic nature of commons creation, and acknowledging the role of
narrative in shaping knowledge production and use, suggest the need to embrace and update Ostrom's concernfor institutionalchange. I offer afew modest suggestions for how to accomplish this task. These include adopting a
broaderdefinition of "institution,"incorporatinga holistic approach to human
agency, giving attention to the recursive interactions between a commons and
its institutionalenvironment, and focusing on how technologies are shaped by
their interpretive and institutional context. Each proposal recalls efforts to
bridge enduring divides between "old" and "new" institutionalism in economics as well as sociology.
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INTRODUCTION

Many years ago, I visited the Museum of Modem Art in New York
City and happened upon what became my favorite painting. I often
wonder what drew me to this particular work: the watercolors, the birdlike figures, the contraption on which they were perched. The painting also had an uneasy feel to it, as if Paul Klee were shielding
something from the viewer. The machine-like quality of the birds was
lost on me, as was their placement on a wire by some unseen force,
where they hovered over a void. My fondness for Twittering Machine1
tells me that even at an early age, I was developing a fascination with
the seemingly tidy frameworks that rise above the vast expanse of
human behavior. ConstructingCommons in the CulturalEnvironment2 offers intellectual property scholars one such framework. The Institutional Analysis and Development (LAD) framework, carefully crafted
by Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues at the Workshop in Political
Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University, 3 is the most oft-cited
approach in the relatively young field of public policy studies. 4 There
is much to recommend the framework and efforts of Professors
Madison, Frischmann, and Strandburg to conform it to cultural as opposed to natural commons dilemmas. In their article, they remind us
of the role of law in studying new forms of human organization 5 (a
tradition dating back to Karl Llewellyn 6 ), offer a refreshing call for
cumulative research projects that are all too scarce in legal scholarship, 7 and introduce a means of capturing the diverse arrangements
that drive our information economy.8 They reproduce the latter, the
LAD framework, in Figure 1 of their article. 9 This framework repre1 The Museum of Modern Art, The Collection, Paul Klee, Twittering Machine (Die
Zwitscher-Maschine) (1922), available at http://www.moma.org/collection/object.php?
object id=37347 (last visited Mar. 11, 2010).
2 Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, Constructing
Commons in the CulturalEnvironment, 95 CORNELL L. REv. 657 (2010).
3
See Elinor Ostrom, InstitutionalRational Choice: An Assessment of the InstitutionalAnaly-

sis and Development Framework, in THEORIES

OF THE POLICY PROCESS

35, 41-49 (Paul A. Saba-

tier ed., 2007) (explaining the LAD framework).
4 Paul A. Sabatier, Introduction:The Need for Better Theories, in THEORIES OF THE POLICY
PROCESS, supra note 3, at 8-9 ("[Institutional rational choice, which includes the LAD
framework,] is clearly the most developed of all the frameworks in this volume and is arguably the most utilized in the United States . . ").
5 See Madison et al., supra note 2, at 659-63.
6 See Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective,40 YALE L.J. 704,
704-36 (1931).
7
For a discussion of the challenges and ambiguities of cumulative research in law
and the social sciences, see Edward L. Rubin, Law and the Methodology of Law, 1997 Wis. L.
REV. 521, 555-56.
8 See Madison et al., supra note 2, at 664-65 ("[A] systematic, comprehensive, and
theoretically informed research framework offers significant potential for learning within
and across these commons phenomena.").
9 See id. at 680 fig. L
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sents the world of a common-pool resource 0 in all of its biophysical,
institutional, social, and cognitive complexity with the elegant flow of
a small number of arrows across Ostrom's conceptual map.
It is easy to understand why Madison, Frischmann, and
Strandburg chose the LAD framework, and I will reiterate some of its
strengths. We should also note that a framework-which as Ostrom
points out, can accommodate multiple theories and models1 1 and
merely begins to organize our inquiry-already has certain parts fused
together and mechanisms set in motion. Contrasting them with theories and models, Ostrom emphasizes that frameworks "organize diagnostic and prescriptive inquiry," "provide a metatheoretical language
that can be used to compare theories,"1 2 and "attempt to identify the
universal elements that any theory relevant to the same kind of phenomena would need to include." 13 Frameworks, in other words, are
not clean slates. They represent a good deal of work in imposing a
level of order on a social system. An effort to hoist one such approach
to human interaction above others should raise questions.
Madison et al. intuit these questions as they try to escape the LAD
framework's functionalist underpinnings. 14 In ostensibly presenting
simple graphical adjustments and a broader expressive turn, the authors hint at longstanding struggles over agency and structure, the
dynamics of institutional change, and what Pierre Bourdieu decries as
the "rock-bottom antinomy upon which all the divisions of the social
scientific field are ultimately founded, namely, the opposition between objectivism and subjectivism." 15 We have witnessed these struggles before in the writings of institutionalist scholars crudely labeled

10 Ostrom defined a common-pool resource ("CPR") as a good "for which subtractability in units appropriated from and restricting access to the resource or facility is a
nontrivial institutional problem." Elinor Ostrom & James Walker, Neither Markets nor States:

Linking Transformation Processes in Collective Action Arenas, in
CHOICE: A HANDBOOK 35, 40 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997).
11

J.

PERSPECTIVES ON

PUBLIC

See Elinor Ostrom & Vincent Ostrom, The Quest for Meaning in Public Choice, 63 AM.

ECON. & SOC. 105, 112-14 (2004).
12
Ostrom, supra note 3, at 35, 39-40.

Ostrom & Ostrom, supra note 11, at 113 (emphasis omitted).
A functionalist framework embodies two claims: that an institutional form or social
practice leads to a certain effect, and that it exists to encourage that effect. See HAROLD
13

14

KINCAID, PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: ANALYZING CONTmROVERSIES

105 (1996).
Pierre Bourdieu, Vive la Crise!: For Heterodoxy in Social Science, 17
773, 780 (1988) (emphasis omitted).
IN SOCIAL RESEARCH

15

THEORY

&

SOC''
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"new" and "old,"1 6 be they Commons and Williamson 17 or Selznick
and Meyer.' 8 Sadly, these oppositions will endure beyond our efforts
to understand cultural commons, haunting us "like theoretic
ghosts." 19 But they generate a number of bridging innovations that
can assist us as we try to improve upon the LAD framework.
I introduce a few of these innovations in the form of methodological moves, which the authors' proposed changes to Ostrom's framework inspire. Each treats the construction of a cultural commons as
an institutionalization process, where institutions embed in a given
context and serve as templates for action. 20 Institutions are the "web
of values, norms, rules, beliefs, and taken-for-granted assumptions" in
which organizations and their members operate. 2t They are the
blueprints that govern the inner workings of an organization, "specifying the forms and procedures an organization of a particular type
should adopt."22 The authors describe a number of institutions in
their cultural-commons research, including "membership rules," "resource contribution or extraction standards," and "social structures
that describe the roles and interests of individual actors." 23 But in
order to meet their goal of "developing institutions and practices" 24 to
cooperatively manage the knowledge production efforts that dot our
landscape, we have to know how these institutions emerge, persist,
and change.
16 "Old" institutional economics, for example, does not reduce the individual to an
independent entity-it views a transaction as incorporating the social order in which it
occurs. By contrast, in "new" institutional economics, "[m]ethodological individualism
makes the individual with given preferences the fundamental building block of the theory." John Groenewegen, Frans Kerstholt & Ad Nagelkerke, On Integrating New and Old
Institutionalism:Douglass North Building Bridges, 29 J. ECON. IssuEs 467, 468-70 (1995).
17
See generally JOHN R. COMMONS, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLECrIVE ACTION 14-29,

110-12, 288-90 (Kenneth H. Parsons ed., 1950);

OLIVER

E.

WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND

HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 1-49 (1975) (contending that transactional considerations determine which institutional mode of organization will obtain in
what circumstances).
18 See generally PHILIP SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 1-9 (1957) (exploring the nature of critical decisions as they relate to institutional leadership); John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal
Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM.J. Soc. 340, 340-63 (1977) (arguing that formal
structure of many organizations in postindustrial society "reflect the myths of their institutional environments").
19 See Bourdieu, supra note 15, at 780.
20 See Ronald L. Jepperson, Institutions, InstitutionalEffects, and Institutionalism, in THE
NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 143, 149 (Walter W. Powell & PaulJ.
DiMaggio eds., 1991)
(discussing the characteristics
of institutions and
institutionalization).
21
Stephen R. Barley & Pamela S. Tolbert, Institutionalizationand Structuration:Studying
the Links Between Action and Institution, 18 ORG. STUD. 93, 93 (1997).
22
Id. at 93-94.
23
See Madison et al., supra note 2, at *139.
24
MichaelJ. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & KatherineJ. Strandburg, The University
as Constructed Cultural Commons, 30 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 365, 402 (2009).
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Even when applying a framework as refined as Ostrom's, we
should be attentive to the full range of institutions and patterns of
institutional change that shape cultural commons. To ensure such
development, the framework must discourage methodological individualism, accommodate the recursive interaction of structure and
agency, and consider the social construction of technology. If we address the above challenges, we will more fully appreciate the dynamics
that sustain these unique forms of collective action.
I
FOUNDATIONS

Herbert Simon, one of many influences behind Ostrom's research on common-pool resources, 2 5 argued that "[n]othing is more
fundamental in setting our research agenda and informing our re26
search methods than our view of the nature of ... human beings."

It is therefore surprising that Constructing Commons neglects to mention that the LAD framework is a product of institutional rational
choice, which moves away from the neoclassical approach to human
behavior but preserves some of its assumptions. The LAD framework
is a choice-theoretic approach-part of Ostrom's efforts to "expand
the range of rational choice models we use." 27 It is constructed

around a situation where individuals either support or try to change
existing rules by assessing benefits and costs. 28 Her analysis proceeds

from a conception of rational action that includes internal variables
(expected benefits and costs, discount rates, and norms) and adds "situational variables" that affect perceived benefits and costs. 29 The vari-

ables feed into judgments about the benefits and costs of
transforming rules as Ostrom describes in her classic text, Governing
30
the Commons.
Twenty years later, the framework remains an effort to place
before a researcher "the major types of structural variables present to
some extent in all institutional arrangements" and an "action arena"
in which interactions lead to outcomes of interest.3 1 If we define the
action arena, we "isolate the immediate structure" that contributes to
25

See, e.g.,
ELINOR

MON-POOL

RESOURCES

&JAMES WALKER, RULES, GAMES, AND COM(noting the consistency of their results with

OSTROM, Roy GARDNER

195-220 (1994)

bounded rationality).
26 Herbert A. Simon, Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political
Science, 79 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 293, 303 (1985).
27 Elinor Ostrom, A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action,
92 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1, 2 (1998).
28

ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR

COLLECTIVE ACTION

193, 195-205 (1990).

29

Id. at 193.

30

See id. at 197 fig.6.2, 199 fig.6.3.
Ostrom & Ostrom, supra note 11, at 114 (emphasis omitted).

31
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interactions and outcomes through an aggregate of, inter alia, participants, "potential outcomes that are linked to individual sequences
of actions," and "costs and benefits . . . assigned to actions and

outcomes."3 2 Such variables are Ostrom's "givens." 3 3 Ostrom notes
that her framework is compatible with "[e] conomic theory, game theory, transaction cost theory, social choice theory, covenantal theory,
and theories of public goods and common-pool resources," 34 a list
that is instructive in both the order of its presentation and also what it
excludes.
Ostrom criticizes and improves upon what she refers to as the
"thin model" of rational choice. 35 Early writings about social dilemmas, which arise when individuals make discrete choices in what turn
out to be interdependent situations, were motivated by this simpler
version of rational choice theory that came to dominate Ostrom's discipline of political science.3 6 With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy
to see why the multiparty prisoner's dilemma of Garrett Hardin's
"tragedy of the commons" '3 7 or the free riders that figure prominently
in Olson's logic of collective action 38-both examples of a thin model
of rational choice in action-would lead to unnecessarily dire predictions: when self-interested individuals with stable, clear, and fixed
preferences try to maximize utility along a narrow time horizon (often
a one-shot interaction) without external influences, resources are not
adequately cared for and public goods are underprovided. Ostrom's
contributions include her work to bring rational choice in line with
the limits of human cognition and to show that, despite our constraints (such as Simon's notion of bounded rationality), we can,
through the design of institutions, advance social welfare. 39 She also
demonstrates that we are not limited to the generic categories of institutional arrangements (markets with individual property rights and
32 Id. at 117; see also Mark Lubell, Collaborative Institutions, Belief-Systems, and Perceived
Policy Effectiveness, 56 POL. RES. Q. 309, 309 (2003) ("Research in the institutional rational
choice (IRC) tradition at least implicitly assumes perceived effectiveness is a function of
explicit cost/benefit calculations based on objective information about the characteristics
of the action arena in which collective action takes place." (emphasis omitted) (citation
omitted)); Edella Schlager & William Blomquist, A Comparison of Three Emerging Theories of
the Policy Process, 49 POL. RES. Q. 651, 653 (1996) ("Actors' strategy choices are guided by
their perceptions of expected benefits and costs, conditioned by the decision situation.").
33 Ostrom & Ostrom, supra note 11, at 117.
34

Ostrom, supra note 3, at 40.

35 Ostrom, supra note 27, at 9.
36 Elinor Ostrom, The Danger of Self-Evident Truths, 33 POL. ScI. & POL. 33, 37-38
(2000).
37 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-48 (1968).
38

MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIvE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY

33-52 (1965) (discussing the free-rider problem in a variety of contexts).
supra note 25, passim (using empirical data to study the institutional
theory of common-pool resource dilemmas).
OF GROUPS
39

OSTROM ET AL.,
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bureaucracies). Ostrom and her colleagues identify a broad array of
alternatives through inductive review of case studies and deductive
40
modeling of resource-appropriation regimes.
Yet even with adjustments such as the bounded rationality of individuals and institutional scaffolds to encourage cooperation, the unit
of analysis in institutional rational choice often remains the individual.41 The question of when self-interested individuals will have sufficient incentive to cooperate, which in the AD framework is driven by
a focus on rules, 42 does not take us as far as we might have hoped had
rational choice not been our point of departure. At base, it is still a
theory of agency that mirrors new institutional economics, which Ostrom notes shares a number of key elements with the LAD framework. 43 Both focus on making opportunistic behavior costly through
44
institutional arrangements, particularly rules and norms.
In the field of new institutional economics (NIE), Oliver Williamson extended Chester Barnard's insight that organizations could
"compensate for the cognitive limitations of individuals."45 Williamson investigated when, in the absence of complete contracting (which
is impossible due to bounded rationality and opportunistic behavior),
40
See, e.g., id.; Ostrom, supra note 27, at 8 (noting that field and experimental research suggest that "individuals temporarily caught in a social-dilemma structure are likely
to invest resources to innovate and change the structure itself in order to improve joint
outcomes" through a "continuous trial-and-error process until a rule system is evolved that
participants consider yields substantial net benefits").
41
See, e.g., Pranab Bardhan & Isha Ray, Methodological Approaches to the Question of the
Commons, 54 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 655, 660-61 (2006) (linking methodological
individualism to the commons research of Ostrom and others, which asks "under what
rules and incentives a group of self-regarding individuals would cooperate to govern the
commons and whether or not specific asymmetries would prevent cooperation from
emerging" (citations omitted)); Bonnie J. McCay & Svein Jentoft, Market or Community Failure? CriticalPerspectives on Common Property Research, 57 HUM. ORG. 21, 23 (1998) (describing the methodological individualism of Ostrom's "communitarian approach, which
examines endogenous and exogenous factors that distinguish between successes and failures at community-based common resource management"); PeterJ. Robertson & Shui-Yan
Tang, The Role of Commitment in Collective Action: Comparing the OrganizationalBehavior and
RationalChoice Perspectives,55 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 67, 69-70 (1995); Nikolaos Zahariadis, Comparing Three Lenses of Policy Choice, 26 POL'Y STUD. J. 434, 437, 440 (1998).
42
OSTROM, supra note 28, at 50-55; EUNOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL
DwrERsrrv 16-22 (2005).
43
Ostrom, supra note 3, at 35-36 ("The elements involved in the framework are
closely related to concepts that play an important role in related theories, such as those
represented in the work of Douglass C. North, Oliver Williamson, and others in the 'new
institutional economics' tradition.").
44
CompareOsTROM, supra note 28, at 197 fig.6.2, 199 fig.6.3, with Sumantra Ghoshal &
Peter Moran, Bad for Practice:A Critique of the Transaction Cost Theory, 21 AcAD. MGsrr. REv.
13, 19 fig.1 (1996).
45
W. Richard Scott, Symbols and Organizations:From Barnard to the Institutionalists, in
ORGANIZATION THEORY- FROM CHESTER BARNu TO THE PRESENT AND BEYOND 38, 38 (Oliver E. Williamson ed., 1990).
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transactions should be organized within a hierarchy or firm. 46 As with

Ostrom's common-pool regimes, which rely on rules, monitoring, and
escalating enforcement to ensure resource protection, NIE concerns
the need to avert opportunistic behavior with clever institutional innovations, such as long-run contracts firms use to economize on transaction costs and render malfeasance costly. This approach can lead to
an undersocialized view of human behavior. 47 In economic-institutional frameworks generally, institutions do not so much produce elements that are necessary to rise above a social dilemma (such as trust)
as provide functional substitutes for them in the form of rules.
To varying degrees, Ostrom and Williamson depart from neoclassical theory. In the TAD framework's effort to move past the thin view
of rational choice, it acknowledges that decision making is not entirely
independent-for example, individuals may be members of a community of shared norms that alters their calculus of benefits and costs.
But neither effort emerges entirely unscathed, as Madison et al.'s
struggles with a characteristic other than the framework's comfort
with methodological individualism shows. 48 The authors compare the
"functionalist approach that Ostrom and her colleagues take" to the
functionalist view of intellectual property: "' [I] n the absence of [some
institutional solution], there would be a significant underinvestment
in (some types of) [intellectual resources] because of the risk that
competitors would appropriate the value of the [resources].' -49 This
habit of referring to functions as "ends which determine the course of
events" 50 is a common criticism of institutionalists new and old, in economics as well as sociology.
In NIE, for example, institutional innovations arise out of "global,
cost-minimizing behaviour" as part of a competitive evolutionary process. 5 1 Akin to the functionalism of early theories of private property,
where inefficient institutions are selected out of the population, 52 NIE
46
See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost
Approach, 87 Am.J. Soc. 548 passim (1981).
47
Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness,

inTHE

SocIOLoc

OF ECONOMIC LIFE

53, 59 (Mark Granovetter & Richard Swedberg eds.,

1992).
48
See Madison et al., supra note 2, at 671 ("The functionalist aspect of our proposed
framework mirrors the functionalist approach that Ostrom and her colleagues take with
respect to regimes governing the sharing and exploitation of natural resources.").
49 Id. at 666, 671 (quoting Brett M. Frischmann, The Pull of Patents, 77 FORDHAM L.
REv. 2143, 2156 (2009)).
50
Steven R. Brown, Structural and Functional Information, 35 POL'v Scl. 285, 286
(2002).
51
Geoffrey M. Hodgson, InstitutionalEconomic Theory: The Old Versus the New, I REv.
POL. ECON. 249, 254 (1989); Malcolm Rutherford, What Is Wrong with the New Institutional
Economics (and What Is Still Wrong with the Old), 1 REV. POL. ECON. 299, 306 (1989).
52
See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347, 350
(1967).
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predicts that governance structures will become more prevalent to the
extent they minimize transaction costs. 53 A similar tautological rea-

soning can occur in commons research, where successful collective
action appears individually rational54 and adaptive efficiency is assumed for enduring common-pool resource regimes. 55 The LAD
framework and NIE also share a foundation in game theory, which
can model the spontaneous emergence of institutions such as norms
through their repetition across infinite (or at least indefinite) time
horizons. 56 By contrast, old institutional economics proceeds from a
more holistic rationality. It relies on historical analysis and considers
individuals in terms of their position within various entities, with their
position determining "the values, ideas, knowledge, preferences, pur57
poses and constraints they face.."

Similar bouts with functionalism exist in sociology. For example,
Talcott Parsons's work linking organizational change to adaptive efforts is arrayed against new institutionalist accounts of formal organizational structures that persist despite their inefficiency. 58 In neither
field do pendulum swings of this sort lead to necessarily more complete approaches to institutional change. For example, new institutionalist sociology pays too much attention to structure (as opposed to
NIE's focus on the behavior of agents) and ironically adopts its own
functionalist explanation for why organizations adopt similar practices
53
See Mark Setterfield, A Model of Institutional Hysteresis, 27 J. ECON. ISSUES 755, 758
(1993) ("The central contention of the NIE is that institutions arise spontaneously in the
course of market activity."); Oliver E. Williamson, OrganizationalInnovation: The Transaction-Cost Approach, in ENTREPRENEURSHIP 101, 125 (Joshua Ronen ed., 1983) ("[E]fficiency is
the main and only systematic factor responsible for the organizational changes that have
occurred.").
54 Bryan E. Burke, Hardin Revisited: A CriticalLook at Perception and the Logic of the Commons, 29 HUM. ECOLOGY 449, 457 (2001) (summarizing Ostrom's argument that "it may be
rational for common resource users to forego individual benefits and cooperate toward
collective goals").
55
For examples of how common-pool resource regimes may endure for reasons other
than economic efficiency, see Bonnie J. McCay, Emergence of Institutionsfor the Commons:
Contexts, Situations, and Events, in THE DRAmA OF THE COMMONS 361, 361-402 (Elinor Ostrom et al. eds., 2002), and David Mosse, Collective Action, Common Property, and Social Capital
in South India: An Anthropological Commentary, 54 ECON. DEv. & CULTURAL CHANGE 695
(2006).
56
See OSTROM ET AL, supra note 25, at 23-50.
57
Fernando Toboso, InstitutionalIndividualism and Institutional Change: The Searchfor a
Middle Way Mode of Explanation, 25 CAMBRIDGEJ. ECON. 765, 767 (2001); see also Setterfield,
supra note 53, at 757.
58
See Paul Colomy, Neofunctionalism and Neoinstitutionalism:Human Agency and Interest
in Institutional Change, 13 Soc. F. 265, 267-69 (1998); Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell,
Introduction to THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 1, 11-19 (Walter
W. Powell & PaulJ. DiMaggio eds., 1991); Paul M. Hirsch & Michael Lounsbury, Ending the
Family Quarrel: Toward a Reconciliation of "Old" and "New" Institutionalisms, 40 AM. BEHAV.
SCIENTIST 406, 409-10 (1997).
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over time. 59 But these intellectual shifts can inform the present debate over common-pool resource management and its extension to
cultural commons. They offer suggestions for how to properly balance individualism and holism, structure and agency, and objective
and subjective elements in a way that is useful for sustained inquiry.
They can help us resolve not only how to systematize and inventory
studies of commons dilemmas, where the IAD framework has proven
its worth, but also identify the kinds of studies that we should carry
out.
It is important that we undertake this exercise to question
whether the LAD framework-with echoes of opportunism among
self-interested individuals (prominent in Williamson's transaction cost
economics approach), Axelrod's tit-for-tat strategy and the emergence
of norms (that appears in Ostrom's framework in the form of monitoring and escalating enforcement), and other remnants of a choicetheoretic approach-can properly assess whether institutions hinder
or help resolve the collective action problems that exist in cultural
commons. Although the LAD framework is open to contributions
from a broad range of disciplines, a choice-theoretic framework will,
when a legal academy that shares political science's infatuation with
rational choice adopts it,60 fit more easily with certain explanations of
cultural commons including NIE. Such approaches give less attention
to historical and anthropological accounts, institutionalist alternatives
to NIE, and research that focuses on the embeddedness of actors and
network effects, which are of particular importance to cultural commons, including open source software.
Without such accounts, we will be less able to critically evaluate
the norms that sustain cooperative behavior, or view the institutions of
today as expressions of path dependence or the micropolitics of a
place or network. We will ask questions in order to figure out how the
commons solved the first-order problem of credible commitment and
second- and third-order concerns of monitoring and enforcement,
but we will not be as attentive to how institutional structures arise,
shape preferences, or act beyond the realm of purposive behavior.
And we will lack the means of sifting through complex forms of governance to locate essential mechanisms that may be of interest to
policymakers.

59

See, e.g., Mark C. Suchman, ManagingLegitimacy: Strategicand InstitutionalApproaches,

20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571 (1995).
60
See generally Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1051 (2000) (ex-

plaining how legal scholarship makes use of the rational choice assumption and how
behavioral science improves rational choice theory).
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In important ways, Madison et al. begin such a calibration exercise. The authors point out that community production of intellectual property is not a one-size-fits-all activity. They note the
complexity of efforts to overcome blocking patents, protect open
source information through new licensing schemes, and the like.
They adopt the best of Ostrom's commons framework-its nested
levels that can explain institutional change and its rich findings on the
process of self-governance. And they show, often implicitly in their
study of the research university, 61 that the creation and maintenance
of cultural commons is at base an institutionalization process, shaped
62
by "the expectations of a field, a department, a lab, and so forth"
and by norms and rituals that diffuse into the "smallest nooks and
crannies" 63 of the academy.
64
While Madison et al. are faithful to the "clusters of questions"
they find important and add several prominent innovations 65 that,
they admit, "complicate the project of specifying and describing commons,"66 the broader challenges of studying institutional change remain. Indeed, Madison et al.'s analysis of the university overwhelms
the reader with data on everything from the nesting of archive-withinlibrary-within-school to the norms of a workshop presentation. How
do we truly understand what they refer to as the "cycle of commons
construction"? 67 What mechanisms drive this institutionalization process? Answering such fundamental questions as how a university interacts with its institutional environment, how individuals within the
academy-who are in large part shaped by this environment-are also
able to question and change various roles and practices, and how
some practices can become taken for granted and shape the commons beyond the realm of rational choice, will get us closer to the
mechanisms of commons construction that the authors seek to understand. Their proposed modifications to the LAD framework hint at
ways in which we can organize our research.

61

Madison et al., supra note 24.

62
63

Id. at 390-91.
Id. at 390.

64

Id. at 374.

65 For example, they point to the need to bring the LAD framework in line with intellectual property's unique characteristics (e.g., boundaries are hard to define for nonexcludable, nonrivalrous goods; resources must at some point be created before they are
shared). See Madison et al., supra note 2, at 666.
66 Madison et al., supra note 24, at 377.
67

Id. at 388.
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II
METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS

A. Functionalism and the Many-Variables Problem
The social sciences do not often encourage productive relations
between different theoretical "imageries."68 The LAD framework is a
welcome departure in its efforts to blend two such imageries: institutionalist arguments about sets of enforceable rules provide initial conditions for the framework's largely actor-centric hub, allowing the two
to exist in a kind of modular complementarity. Still, Madison et al.
recognize that this accommodation arises within what remains a functionalist approach. Understanding that creative and information-intensive activities involve a good deal more than public-goods
production, the authors do not want to adopt Ostrom's approach to
common-pool resources whole cloth. They propose three key departures. First, they suggest that we expand the number of variables in
the framework. 69 They want to discourage researchers from looking
just to mechanisms of exclusion or appropriation, for example, which
might mask other forces at work within a commons.
Researchers who use the LAD framework to study commons dilemmas have identified far more variables than they could ever analyze with the appropriate level of precision. One noted LAD scholar
admits that, after many years of research, the framework has yet to
provide a theoretically consistent account of collective-goods provision. 70 Arun Agrawal reviewed the work of three scholars, including
Ostrom, and found that they alone identified thirty-six conditions
"that seem relevant to the successful management of common-pool
resources," a list he narrowed to twenty-four factors. 7 1 He added that:
At present, we do not have any reliable way to assess the degree of
correlation among these factors ....

As soon as we concede the

possibility that somewhere between 30 and 40 variables affect the
management of common-pool resources, and that some of these
variables may have important interactional effects, we confront tre72
mendous analytical problems.
68

See PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS

8

(2004); see also ARTHUR L. STINCHCOMBE, CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL THEORIES 57-129 (1968)

(describing the "causal imagery" of demographic, functional, and historicist theories).
69 See Madison et al., supra note 2, at 672 (explaining that certain features of cultural
resources "add to the range of variables that must be considered when studying commons
institutions"); see also id. at 671 (representing modifications to Ostrom's framework in the
form of "baskets of questions" that will be needed to "interrogate constructed cultural
commons").
70
See Arun Agrawal, Common Resources and InstitutionalSustainability, in THE DRAMA OF
THE COMMONS, supra note 55, at 41, 45-46.
71
Arun Agrawal, Sustainable Governanceof Common-Pool Resources: Context, Methods, and
Politics, 32 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 243, 254 (2003).
72
Id.
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Facing this and related problems such as endogeneity and omitted variable bias, we can appreciate why Ostrom was careful not to set
forth her framework until she could review a large number of case
studies 7 3 and why she and her colleagues link their inductive review
74
of case studies with deductive theory building.
The studies of patent pools, jambands, and other cultural commons that Madison et al. identify7 5 pale in comparison to the dozens

of empirical studies that served as the raw material for Ostrom's Governing the Commons. Obviously, a single article does not give the authors sufficient space in which to analyze these studies and inductively
suggest revisions to the TAD framework. Nor is there discussion of
how Ostrom's efforts to inform case selection and hypothesis generation with modeling and game theory should apply, if at all, to the
study of cultural commons. These are questions at the foundation of
76
the kind of cumulative research project that Madison et al. propose.
But one could argue that mirroring Ostrom's approach may not be
well advised, given how far the framework has to go in generating and
testing causal mechanisms to connect important variables. Perhaps it
is better to recall that metaphors such as the prisoner's dilemma are
useful not because they are accurate across a broad range of human
interaction but because they capture a key feature of human behavior
that warrants greater scrutiny. It is also my guess that many of the
variables that we might identify through the study of cultural commons are not those that we should address as a matter of policy.
Frameworks with a narrower scope than the LAD framework (or
Madison et al.'s version) could arguably be more useful in identifying
a small number of mechanisms that are of special relevance to effective legal and policy intervention.
With the above methodological concerns in mind, there is some,
in my opinion, mistaken appeal to simply extending NIE to cultural
commons such as open source software. As mentioned, NIE shares a
number of assumptions with the LAiD framework, and similarly looks
to the benefits and costs of participation in certain governance struc73
See generally OSTROM, supra note 28, passim (developing a wide range of case studies
before exposing a framework for understanding self-governing common-pool resources).
74
See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 25, at 75-97 (using descriptions of rules that fishing
communities employ as an empirical basis to develop a common theoretical language of
rules); Koen P. Overmars, Wouter T. de Groot & Marco G.A. Huigen, ComparingInductive
and Deductive Modeling of Land Use Decisions: Principles, a Model and an Illustrationfrom the
Philippines, 35 Hum. EcoLoGY 439, 450-51 (2007) (arguing that using a deductive approach in interaction with inductive work will enhance progress in land use science).
75
See Madison et al., supra note 2, at 660-63.
76 Id. at 707 ("[W]e offer the framework described in this Part as a template for ongoing case study investigations of constructed cultural commons across a broad variety of
domains.").

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:757

tures.7 7 Yochai Benkler, whose article is cited by Madison et al., shares
their interest in "[c]ommons-based peer production. '7 8 But he argues that Ostrom's approach "do[es] not give a complete answer to
the sustainability of motivation and organization for the truly open,
large-scale nonproprietary peer production projects. ' 79 Benkler's reluctance to extend the LAD framework to open source suggests his
discomfort with Ostrom's "design principles"-a small list of variables
culled from case studies that, over time, might suggest the necessary
building blocks for the cooperative management of a common-pool
resource. 80 The design principles are well adapted to small-scale resource situations that encourage face-to-face interaction, clearly defined boundaries, and broad participation in the modification of
rules, 8 l but do not seem to coincide with the distributed nature of
many cultural commons.
Building on Williamson's approach, Benkler proposes a framework using relative social cost to identify when peer production would
be more efficient than market- or firm-based production. He argues
that "it is relatively easy to adapt the transaction-costs theory of the
firm and the comparative institutional cost theory of property to include [peer production]. "82 If we place a boundedly rational actor
with preferences for monetary, intrinsic (hedonic), and social-psychological rewards in a network that pools a sufficiently large number of
contributions, direct monetary incentives for participation need only
be trivial. 83 Once we solve the motivation to take part in an open
source project, modular project components and low-cost integration
77
SeeYochai Benkler, Coase'sPenguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE
L.J. 369 (2002) (discussing the LAD framework and NIE's shared goal of averting opportunistic behavior by making it costly through institutional innovations, adoption of a functionalist, ends-oriented approach to institutions, and foundation in game theory).
78 Id. at 375; see also Benoit Demil & Xavier Lecocq, Neither Market nor Hierarchy nor
Network: The Emergence of Bazaar Governance, 27 ORG. STUD. 1447, 1457-58 (2006) (applying
"transaction cost economics" to open source and arguing that the success of such projects
depends in large part on their "sweeping economies of both transaction and production
costs").

79

Benkler, supra note 77, at 378.

80
Ostrom posited that at some point, "it will be possible to identify a set of necessary
design principles and that such a set will contain the core of what has been identified
here." OSTROM, supra note 28, at 91. Elsewhere, she emphasizes that "there is no blueprint
that can be used to create effective local institutions" and that the design principles should
not alone be considered sufficient for encouraging effective common-pool resource management. Elinor Ostrom, Designing Complexity to Govern Complexity, in PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
THE ENVIRONMENT: SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL IssuEs 33, 43 (Susan Hanna & Mohan

Munasinghe eds., 1995).
81
See Agrawal, supra note 71, at 248 (discussing commons scholars' view that "members of small local groups can design institutional arrangements to help manage resources
sustainably . . . [by implementing] a small set of conditions that are positively related to
local self management of resources.").

82
83

Benkler, supra note 77, at 403.
See id. at 407 n.78, 434-35.
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of contributions into a final product help drive successful collaboration. 84 Others, includingJosh Lerner andJean Tirole, 8 5 have adapted
the standard framework of labor economics to open source development, using an approach that also focuses on individuals' perceived
86
benefits and costs.

What is the justification for moving beyond these efforts to understand cultural commons? Madison et al. explain that if we rely exclusively on functionalist accounts of intellectual property creation, such
as one based on transaction costs, we will analyze only a narrow set of
variables. 87 What do we gain by substituting a more complex LAD
framework for, say, an extension of NIE to cultural commons? 88 First,
if we were only to extend NIE, we would risk retaining its methodological individualism. 89 We would focus on institutions as a means of facilitating transactions while minimizing vulnerability to opportunistic
behavior. 90 Our theoretical work would locate cultural commons as
hybrids along a market-hierarchy continuum, even though as network
See id. at 426-39.
See, e.g.,Josh Lerner &Jean Tirole, Some Simple Economics of Open Source, 50J. INDUS.
ECON. 197, 212-15 (2002) ("A programmer working on an open source software development project incurs a variety of benefits and costs [including opportunity cost, improved
performance on paid employment tasks, hedonic gain, and career advancement and ego
gratification]."). If the individual programmer perceives a net benefit from engaging in
the open source project (equal to immediate payoff plus delayed payoff), she will be motivated to participate. See id. at 212-13.
86 There is considerable overlap between Lerner and Tirole's findings, which follow
NIE's view of governance as a trade-off between incentives and controls, and variables of
interest to innovation theorists, who also focus on the motivations of individual users and
contributors. See, e.g., Eric von Hippel & Georg von Krogh, Open Source Software and the
"Private-Collective"Innovation Model: Issues for Organization Science, 14 ORG. Sci. 209, 217
(2003) ("Programmers contribute freely to the provision of a public good because they
garner private benefits from doing so."). Von Hippel and von Krogh's model shares much
with economic-institutional approaches to cultural commons. It explains the solution to a
collective action problem such as open source software by showing that the benefits of
contributing are greater than those free riders obtain. Similarly, the benefits of the free
revealing of innovations, if properly specified, also outweigh its costs. See id. at 213-17; see
also Lars Bojeppesen & Lars Frederiksen, Why Do Users Contributeto Firm-HostedUser Communities? The Case of Computer-ControlledMusic Instruments, 17 ORG. Sci. 45, 45 (2006) (discussing the benefit online information sharing confers to innovators); Georg von Krogh,
Sebastian Spaeth & Karim R. Lakhani, Community, Joining, and Specialization in Open Source
Software Innovation: A Case Study, 32 RES. POL'Y 1217, 1234 (2003) (discussing the educational benefit of the open source environment to rising developers).
87 See Madison et al., supra note 2, at 671-72.
88 Benkler suggests the following division of labor: NIE would isolate important mechanisms for further analysis within "the domains of social psychology and anthropology, or,
if done formally, through artificial life-type modeling" to better understand actions and
motivations that are beyond the purview of economic functions. Benkler, supra note 77, at
424.
89 See Fernando Toboso, Explaining the Process of Change Taking Place in Legal Rules and
Social Norms: The Cases of InstitutionalEconomics and New InstitutionalEconomics, 2 EUR. J.L.
ECON. 63 (1995).
90 See id. (explaining the centrality of transaction costs to new institutionalist theory).
84
85
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forms of organization, we should set cultural commons apart from this
continuum.9 ' Walter Powell, who studied network forms when they
arose in the late 1980s, cautioned against analyzing them according to
their transaction costs: "[Miany of the [network] arrangements ...
actually increase transaction costs, but in return they provide concrete
benefits or intangible assets that are far more valuable. The reduction
of uncertainty, fast access to information, reliability, and responsiveness are among the paramount concerns that motivate the participants .
,o"92
He viewed a transaction cost analysis of these new
governance arrangements with suspicion.
While Ostrom notes that her framework is compatible with NIE,
the rich literature her study of natural resource management encouraged demonstrates that a transaction cost-based approach is of
limited use to cultural commons researchers. The pervasive emergence of cooperation in common-pool resource regimes, often under
conditions that are not favorable to such behavior, suggests that something beyond opportunism and its institutional control is at work. 93
In addition, the LAD framework's many-variables problem calls for a
treatment of rationality that is at odds with NIE. So far, "[t]he connection between situation and outcome" under the LAD framework is
"quite loose," and it is unlikely that Ostrom has "completely missed
some determinative circumstance that alone or in combination with
other features of the situation turns cooperation on and off."'9 4 Failing this, an outcome "can only be explained by reference to the history of a (perhaps changing) bundle of local conditions. '9 5 Thus we
need to consider grounding our research in a theory of agency where
individuals define themselves and articulate their goals and strategies
in reference to their social setting.9 6 This conclusion recalls efforts
91 See Walter W. Powell, Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization,12
RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 295, 298 (1990) ("[A]lthough I was earlier of the view that
nonmarket, nonhierarchical forms represented hybrid modes, I now find that this mixed
mode or intermediate notion is not particularly helpful. It is historically inaccurate, overly
static, and it detracts from our ability to explain many forms of collaboration that are viable
means of exchange." (citation omitted)).
92

Id. at 323.

93

See Charles F. Sabel, ConstitutionalOrderingin HistoricalContext, in GAMES IN HIERARCHIES AND NETwORs: ANALYrICAL AND EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF GOVER.NANCE INSTITUTIONS 65, 83-84 (Fritz W. Scharpf ed., 1993). This is in part because a
transaction cost approach alone cannot account for high levels of cooperation. See
Ghoshal & Moran, supra note 44, at 25.
94 Sabel, supra note 93, at 85.
95
Id.
96 See id. at 86-90 for how the concepts of reflexivity and sociability can substitute for
NIE's focus on autonomous utility maximizers. See also Granovetter, supra note 47, at
65-68 (showing how the embeddedness of, for example, subcontractors within "a community of construction personnel, generate[s] standards of expected behavior that not only
obviate the need for but are superior to pure authority relations in discouraging malfeasance"); Charles Perrow, Economic Theories of Organization, 15 THEORY & SOC'Y 11, 16-18
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within old institutional economics to discard rational actor assumptions "in favor of [an approach] that places economic behavior in its
cultural context." 9 7 Cultural commons researchers will have to decide
how to accomplish this task.
The struggles between followers of old and new institutional economics advise that the first step toward moving past functionalism is
not to expand the set of variables considered a priori. Rather, we
must be clear at the outset in adopting an alternative to methodological individualism. Proponents of more historical and anthropological
studies of commons dilemmas suggest this change. For example, Bonnie McCay argues that Ostrom's framework can obscure "the role of
contextual and external factors" that shape behavior in a commonpool resource:9 8
A common-pool resource scholar [concerned with overgrazing on
arid lands] might quickly jump to a study of the regulatory institutions of local tribal pastoralists, expecting from the middle-range
theory that has developed to find that relatively small, homogeneous groups with a long history in the region have developed rules
and other institutions that help prevent overgrazing of common
lands. However, this 'jumps the gun."... It may turn out that the
patterns are heavily influenced by informal or formal rules and
other institutions, in which cases those institutions are candidates
for further study. But it may turn out that those changes in grazing
activity that warrant the term "overgrazing" have little to do with
local institutions, in comparison with changes in market demand,
conflicts among pastoralist groups, expanded investment in livestock on the part of urban elites, or invasion of the grasslands by an
99
exotic species.
When an LAD lens is not carefully applied to a new collective action setting, longstanding institutions can be mistaken for the "successful" management of individual incentives. As David Mosse writes,
this is true despite the fact that institutions often persist due to power
imbalances and other dynamics:
From an institutional economic perspective, the answer was clear:
the difference between the two types of village was that self-interested farmers were rationally constrained to follow public rules in
one ecology and not in the other. But, from my perspective, an
equally significant observation was that, in one set of villages, power
and authority tended to be articulated through public institutions(1986) (suggesting conditions within organizations that favor "self-regarding" as opposed
to cooperative and "other-regarding" behavior).
97 Malcolm Rutherford, The Old and the New Institutionalism:Can Bridges Be Built t, 29J.
EcoN. IssuEs 443, 443 (1995).
98 McCay, supra note 55, at 388.
99 Id. at 390 (citation omitted).
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for example, irrigation systems, temples, and service roles that recollected Maravar warrior rule-while, in another set, power operated
less publicly through diffuse private networks of patronage, alliance,
and personal obligation .... Now, the institutional economic account requires no further explanation. The answer to the question
of why self-interested farmers cooperate is built into the cost-benefit
model. But the answer to the question of why caste power does or
does not articulate through public institutions of water control ...is
more complicated. 10 0
The views of human agency expressed above resemble the holistic
approach to rationality of the old institutionalists, which can expose
"variables that are neglected by economic interpretations of organizational behavior."10 1 These variables include the position of individuals within a broader matrix of institutions, and the habits and power
influences that emerge because of those positions. 10 2 How should we
consider such variables in studying cultural commons?
Madison et al. address the need for a more holistic rationality.
They are attentive to the fact that a commons is embedded within a
variety of "social, political, economic, and institutional arrangements."'1 3 Applying their framework to the university, they consider
the history of the commons and catalogue a rich institutional setting
in which individual actors, such as professors, administrators, and students operate. 10 4 This backdrop for human behavior emerges over
time through what the authors refer to as the "[n] esting of commons
institutions within the university."'10 5 Thus, a researcher applying
Madison et al.'s proposed questions to, say, a nanotechnology laboratory will collect plenty of data on the historically grounded expectations, norms, and physical structures that are embedded within the lab
and form the context in which scientists, students, industry representatives, auditors, and administrators interact. They may also begin to
identify a number of "nesting" processes, which in the case of universities include the diffusion of certain models from elite universities to
colleges elsewhere and the transmission of practices from one area of
a university to another (such as a broader library system that influences an archiving system) .1 06 But a holistic rationality should also
point to the mechanisms by which individuals and organizations are
affected by and influence the broader institutions in which they find
100

Mosse, supra note 55, at 704.

101
102

Perrow, supra note 96, at 39.
See Charles K. Wilber & Robert S. Harrison, The Methodological Basis of Institutional

Economics: Pattern Model, Storytelling, and Holism, 12J. EcoN. Issuas 61, 79-80 (1978) (discussing the "holist conception of reality").
103
Madison et al., supra note 2, at 677.
104
See Madison et al., supra note 24, at 378-402.
105
Id. at 385 (internal quotation marks omitted).
106
See id. at 386.
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themselves. Madison et al.'s second adjustment to the IAD framework
moves us closer to the process of institutional creation and change.
B.

Capturing Complexity

Expanding the number of variables under consideration will not
resolve the LAD framework's methodological shortcomings. Nor will
retreating, when faced with the complexity of a social system, to a
transaction cost-based account. 10 7 Such a move risks preserving some
of the problems that underlie a rational choice framework. But simply embracing the complexity of a cultural commons poses similar
risks. Let us consider Madison et al.'s second proposal: make dynamic
effects more central to the analysis.1 08 This suggestion is reminiscent
of C.S. Holling's writings on the uncertain and indeterminate nature
of natural commons and the need for common-pool resource management to move beyond static models of carrying capacity or sustainable yield.10 9
Madison et al. make two broad adjustments to the IAD framework
to reflect the complex relationships that we find in cultural as opposed to natural commons. 110 They add an arrow leading from the
action arena back to exogenous variables such as "resource characteristics."" 1 They also eliminate "outcomes" as a separate object of analysis, equating them with patterns of interaction. 112 These changes
reflect the dynamic nature of the commons. In open source projects,
for instance, "the identity of the dynamic thing called the open source
software program" is continuously feeding into and reflective of the
13
interactions of participants with "rules, resources, and each other."'
These interactions obviate the need for a distinct focus on outcomes:
what is at stake is not simply a product to be manufactured but a governance solution for "loosely aligned contributors, distributed broadly
14
in space and time.""
107
NIE does offer a variety of useful insights. For example, it provides a framework for
analyzing how firms choose to structure their transactions given the intellectual property
rights at stake. See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Proerty Rights and the New InstitutionalEconomics, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1857, 1863-67 (2000) (observing that firms tend to resort to hierarchical forms of integration when faced with the high transaction costs of arm's-length
contracting).
108
See Madison et al., supra note 2, at 672-73; see also id. at 685 (describing how their
modified framework "integrates a more dynamic and contextual understanding of intellectual resources").
109
See ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT 7-9, 334-35 (C.S. Holling ed., 1978).
110 See Madison et al., supra note 2, at 682 & fig.2.

111

112
113
114

Id. atfig.2.
Id.
Id. at 672.
Id. at 705-06.
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How should we operationalize these proposed changes? Both adjustments heighten the importance of the action arena, which generates patterns of interaction and cycles back to influence exogenous
variables. For scholars using the LAD framework, the action arena has
proven difficult to define. One approach that would explicitly capture the dynamic processes of a cultural commons would be to view
the action arena as a complex adaptive system. Robert Axelrod, who
developed one application of this idea, has garnered acclaim for upgrading the prisoner's dilemma to show that cooperation can emerge
in repeated games.1 1 5 His work represents, in Ostrom's words, "one
of the most exciting areas in the social sciences."' " 6 Borrowing from
complexity theory, it organizes the study of how variation, interaction,
and selection occur in the context of diverse, mutually adapting play1 17
ers operating under conditions of uncertainty.'
Open source software, when analyzed as a complex adaptive system, relies on many of the same mechanisms that allowed for the
evolution of multicellular organisms." 8 Consider the Linux operating system: a small group of managers are responsible for maintaining
a "standard" version of Linux, excluding most users and software writers from its reproduction just as the majority of cells in an organism
are excluded from reproductive functions. 119 Control over reproduction allows for considerable variation in code without the threat of
chaotic inconsistency. 120 Linux also overcomes the risks associated
with a complex, interdependent system by isolating software components in modules called "kernels." 121 Each module encourages experimentation according to a unique set of constraints (such as the need
to optimize speed in one module or improve crash resistance in another) 122 Variations can be tested quickly, locally, and with reliable
feedback.' 2 3 The Unix operating system also presents problems that
span incredibly long time horizons, a condition that favors explora115

See generally ROBERT AXELROD,

THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION:

AGENT-BASED

MODELS OF COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION 11-13 (1997) [hereinafter AXELROD, COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION] (arguing that in a prisoner's dilemma context, successful strate-

gies employ reciprocity-based cooperation during multiple iterations of the game); ROBERT
AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 28-30 (1984) [hereinafter AXELROD, EVOLOTION OF COOPERATION] (remarking that to strategize effectively in a prisoner's dilemma

situation, actors must take into account previous iterations of the game).
116
See OSTROM, supra note 28, at 7.
117
See ROBERT AXELROD & MICHAEL D. COHEN, HARNESSING COMPLEXITY.

ORGANIZA-

50-52 (1999) (setting forth factors to consider when determining the benefits of encouraging variation in uncertain situations).
118
Id. at 55.

TIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER

119

Id.

120

Id.
Id. at 57.
Id.
d. at 56-57.

121
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tion and increased variation in available solutions.124 All told, Axelrod's framework would apply a dozen concepts from complexity
theory to a cultural commons. It builds a number of dynamic concepts into the approach, including feedback and path dependence. 125
And it addresses the fact that large groups of actors and their interaction patterns, such as those brought together by modern information
technology, cannot be analyzed using deductive models alone, such as
those that inform Ostrom's IAD framework.1 2 6 Instead, Axelrod advocates supplementing case studies with an inductive review of data gen1 27
erated by computer simulations.

The framework introduces its own methodological challenges.
Simulations figure prominently, and elements of complexity theory
(such as variation and its influence over open source software development) do not always apply to cases in a systematic way. In addition,
Axelrod's approach (with a nod to evolutionary biology) risks replacing one brand of functionalism with another. Indeed, Axelrod's earlier work on repeated games did not depart from the presumption of
opportunism that dominates choice-theoretic approaches-it held it
in check by introducing the "shadow of the future" to exchange situations, 128 which leads to a reevaluation of benefits and costs (a function
served by norms in many TAD accounts of common-pool resources).
Despite these challenges, Axelrod's framework demonstrates that
much ground can be covered by placing patterns of interaction at the
center of our analysis. Studies of complex adaptive systems show that
they have distinct interaction patterns involving both actors and artifacts. 129 Madison et al. are right to focus on them when accounting
for the dynamic nature of a commons. But how do we study patterns
of interaction in a way that allows for a more holistic rationality and
avoids functionalism? A second debate among institutionalists, this
time in sociology, provides some guidance.
New institutionalist sociology (NIS) offers a departure from NIE's
focus on the strategic behavior of boundedly rational individuals. It is
in part a rejoinder to Parsons, who wrote about broad economic shifts
such as the replacement of multifunctional organizations with specialized units in order to improve efficiency. 130 Parsons's depiction of
trends in industrialized nations toward higher levels of efficiency
mimics the functionalist narrative of NIE, where transaction cost re124

Id. at 56.

See id. at 40-41.
See AXELROD, COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION, supra note 115, at 55-56 (describing
the effects of social forces on group interactions as the size of the group increases).
127
See id. at 64-65.
128
See AXELROD, EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION, supra note 115, at 126-32.
129
See AXELROD, COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION, supra note 115, at 63.
130
See TALcoTr PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION 727-75 (1937).
125

126
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duction guides the evolution of organizational forms.13 1 In response,
NIS scholars initially marginalized the role of human agency and tried
to explain too much using structural variables. They defined institutions as routine-reproduced systems 13 2 that, in contrast to the kinds of
institutions that figure prominently in institutional rational choice
(e.g., rules, norms), operate largely beyond the purview of individual
cost-benefit calculation.
NIS moves from individual rational choice to a higher unit of
analysis that focuses on the institutional environment of an organization. An institutional environment, or "organizational field," includes
groups of organizations offering similar products or services as well as
the agencies, funding sources, suppliers, customers, and competitors
that influence the organizations' performance. 13 3 An organizational
field supplies templates, such as standard operating procedures and
new ways of classifying behavior, which are adopted by firms and stabilize how they arrange and govern themselves. Firms gravitate toward
similar procedures and structures, such as when an accounting firm
becomes a professional partnership not for reasons of efficiency but
because its institutional environment views this as a legitimate practice.13 4 This process, referred to as isomorphism, can occur in a number of ways. 13 5 But generally, the form that an organization takes, its
capacity for innovation, and its potential for change are linked to the
characteristics of its institutional context, including whether its organizational field is well developed, tightly coupled, or open to the influ136
ence of other fields.
See supra text accompanying notes 51-57.
SeeJepperson, supra note 20, at 145 ("[I]nstitutions are those social patterns that,
when chronically reproduced, owe their survival to relatively self-activating social
processes.... That is, institutions are not reproduced by 'action' . . . . Rather, routine
reproductive procedures support and sustain the pattern . . ").
133
W. Richard Scott & John W. Meyer, The Organization of Societal Sectors: Propositions
131

132

and Early Evidence, in THE

NEw INSTTUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS,

supra note

20, at 108, 117-20 (defining a societal sector "as (1) a collection of organizations operating
in the same domain, as identified by the similarity of their services, products or functions,
(2) together with those organizations that critically influence the performance of the focal
organizations: for example, major suppliers and customers, owners and regulators, funding sources and competitors").
134
See Christine Oliver, StrategicResponses to InstitutionalProcesses, 16 AcAD. MGMT. REv.
145, 164-67 (1991).
135
Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in OrganizationalFields, 48 AM. Soc. REv. 147, 150 (1983)
(defining three mechanisms for isomorphic change: coercive, stemming from "the problem of legitimacy"; mimetic, "resulting from standard responses to uncertainty"; and normative, "associated with professionalization").
136
See Royston Greenwood & C.R. Hinings, Understanding Radical Organizational
Change: Bringing Together the Old and the New Institutionalism, 21 AcAD. Mcrr. REv. 1022
passim (1996).
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Unfortunately, by emphasizing the routine nature of institutions
and their relative inertia, NIS traded one mode of functionalism for
another, namely the efforts of firms and other organizations to secure
legitimacy. 13 7 Over time, however, NIS analyzed internal dynamics
and the interaction between institutions and the organizations that
ultimately adopt them. How, for example, do ideas, roles, or tasks
develop in an organizational field and affect the actions that we take
within a cultural commons? And what allows for change if those who
operate within a commons internalize the prevailing templates for action? There are a variety of proposals for addressing these questions.
Each accounts for dynamic change by focusing on the recursive interaction of structure and agency. The basic innovation underlying efforts to bridge old and new institutionalism in sociology is to address
the following paradox: actors whose behavior is determined in large
part by their institutional environment can also initiate change.
Although Madison et al. allude to NIS concepts in their study of
cultural commons, they are too quick to label certain aspects of commons construction "intentional human activity."' 38 They refer to the
"expectations of a field" and the role of rituals in shaping some of the
signature events in a university commons.13 9 They also acknowledge
isomorphism, which in their view occurs when certain templates regarding the operation of universities spread "more or less intact across
time and culture."1 40 And their version of the LAD framework, which
allows for attributes of the community, resources, and rules-in-use to
recursively shape patterns of interaction, can accommodate the structural dynamics of NIS as well as insights regarding human agency of141
fered by old institutional sociologists such as Philip Selznick.
More importantly, Madison et al.'s focus, along with Ostrom's, is
on patterns of interaction. As institutions influence recurrent interactions and activities, they become second nature, or part of the stock of
personal knowledge. They shape how problems are interpreted and
work is carried out in ways that are increasingly removed from rational
cost-benefit calculation. This process lies at the dynamic intersection
of agency and structure. To address how institutions emerge, persist,
and change within a cultural commons and in turn affect its govern137
See Suchman, supra note 59, passim (discussing the vast and diverse literature on
strategic and institutional approaches to organizational legitimacy, and examining strategies for gaining, maintaining, and repairing organizational legitimacy).
138
Madison et al., supra note 24, at 377.
139
Id. at 390-93.

140

Id. at 401.

Selznick was concerned with how various influences, coalitions, and competing values can divert the formal mission of an organization like the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA), such as when the TVA became less able to promote environmental standards or the
interests of key constituencies as it responded to external threats. See Philip Selznick, Institutionalism "Old" and "New," 41 ADMIN. ScI. Q. 270 (1996).
141
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ance, we need to study how interaction patterns become locked into
place in settings such as a patent pool or university lab, where they
assume a "relative permanence" that explains much of the behavior
we find.1

42

I briefly sketch several ideas for how this process could be

researched.
The authors state that cultural commons are "often situated in
143
nonhierarchical and distributed institutional settings," or networks.
Thinking about action arenas and their institutional setting as networks covers a lot of ground if we want to accommodate both agency
and structure. Broadly speaking, a network-centric approach defines
rationality as embedded within a social context, emphasizing the relations through which transactions occur.144 The "embedded ties" of a
network encourage trust and other elements that we would not predict in a mere hybrid of market and hierarchical forms." 45 The structure of networks and the position of individuals and organizations
within them can generate insights into social capital, influence, and
power dynamics-matters of human agency that were of interest to
old institutionalist sociologists." 4 6 Identifying the scope of networks,

such as long-term relationships among contractors and subcontractors, also encourages research into the historical development of cultural commons. 14 7 Furthermore, networks can help us isolate the
spillover effects of addressing one issue within other areas of a social
structure, a primary concern among intellectual property
researchers."48
Treating a commons (and its institutional environment) as a network takes us beyond a simple account of agency and structure to the
study of how they interact. Networks are the channels through which
processes such as institutional adoption take place. Cultural commons have ties to government agencies, professions, competitors, and
142

Everett C. Hughes, The Ecological Aspects of Institutions, 1 AM. Soc. REv. 180, 181

(1936).
143
See Madison et al., supra note 2, at 701; see also Katherine J. Strandburg, Gdbor
Csdrdi, Jan Tobochnik, Phter Erdi & Ldszl6 Zaldnyi, Law and the Science of Networks: An
Overview and an Application to the "PatentExplosion, "21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1293, 1294-1318
(2006) (describing the benefits and applications that "network science" can provide to
legal scholarship).
144
See Granovetter, supra note 47, at 63-73.
145
Joel M. Podolny & Karen L. Page, Network Forms of Organization,24 ANN. REV. SoC.
57, 61 (1998).
146 See, e.g., Peter deLeon & Danielle M. Varda, Toward a Theory of CollaborativePolicy
Networks: Identifying Structural Tendencies, 37 POL'v STUD.J. 59, 62 (2009).
147
See id. at 67-68.
148
See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 257,
258-61 (2007) (pointing out the significance of spillovers in the context of innovation).
Network theorists are moving from analysis of social structure alone (through indicators
such as density and equivalence) to how the placement of actors in a network influences
information brokerage, resource sharing, and other processes. See deLeon & Varda, supra
note 146, at 67-68.
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other sources of templates for behavior that their members might
adopt or ignore. Madison et al. provide an example of the institutional environment of a commons:
Members of a [patent] pool may be part of a network structure that
extends to related collectives, firms, individuals, groups, and social
structures, including disciplines and social norms. Research scientists may be organized formally into pools or commons structures
within firms and other formal institutions, such as universities.
Their functional network will include both members of their own
technical art and related arts and other researchers in different arts
who share a related but distinct set of social norms .... Networks in
not-for-profit or educational research settings will overlap to a degree with related networks in commercial environments. Researchers in university science departments will be interested in sharing
information resources with researchers in corporate research-anddevelopment groups. Pools may bridge gaps created by the edges of
1 49
formal institutional structures.
An organization's place within such a network can help us predict
whether it will adopt a new practice or innovation. For example, one
could hypothesize that structural equivalence, which occurs when two
firms are more closely related to a set of third parties than to each
other, is a better predictor of the adoption of a quality assurance prac15 0
tice than cohesion between the two companies.
At the level of either a commons or its institutional context, we
can study the process of institutionalization in keeping with Ostrom's
notion of "nested" analysis that Madison et al. emphasize. 15 1 For institutional context, we can research how standardized rules, roles, and
structures develop and potentially spread. Commentators have criticized NIS for failing to account for these mechanisms. 152 NIS at first
viewed organizations as embedded in networks of institutions, but did
not investigate how those templates for action arose. Institutionalization originates with (a) new ideals set out through verbal and written
arguments and definitions, (b) the specification of tasks, objects,
roles, and relationships among them, and (c) efforts to systematically
See Madison et al., supra note 2, at 701 (citations omitted).
See Isin Guler, Mauro F. Guillfn &John Muir Macpherson, Global Competition, Institutions, and the Diffusion of OrganizationalPractices: The InternationalSpread of ISO 9000 Quality
Certificates, 47 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 207, 226 (2002) (finding that role equivalence, or the extent
to which two firms share similar kinds of relationships with third parties, can help explain
the adoption of ISO 9000 quality certification programs).
151
See Madison et al., supra note 2, at 673-75 (analyzing a particular commons phenomenon at multiple, interacting levels).
152
See, e.g., Hans Hasselbladh &Jannis Kallinikos, The Project of Rationalization:A Critique and Reappraisal of Neo-Institutionalism in OrganizationStudies, 21 ORG. STUD. 697, 701
(2000) ("Neo-institutionalism offers no account of the means through which . . . rules of
conduct, performance principles and devices of control are developed and forms of actorhood constituted.").
149
150
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measure and evaluate each. 153 Together, these efforts create the domains and patterns of acceptable action that could potentially become
part of a commons. 15 4 By defining the networks in which such institutions emerge, we can learn to what degree they have achieved closure
or are still subject to change. To take patent pools as one example, a
new form of contract might emerge within an institutional field and
transform an ideal regarding how patents should be cross-licensed
into a discourse involving unique roles and relations. This could occur within a network of only loosely assembled sources of technical
control (e.g., monitoring, fee setting, recruitment). A new patent
pool could still form in a variety of ways, leaving room for the law to
intervene in a constructive manner.
To study the dynamic elements of a commons that are of interest
to Madison et al., we should next look at how institutions, once they
emerge in an organizational field, "interact with the internal characteristics of an organization. '155 Royston Greenwood and C.R. Hinings
focus on this intersection of agency and structure. 1 56 They carefully
link old institutionalist accounts of how group interests and power imbalances divert organizations from their formal objectives with more
recent findings about the institutional context of a firm. Early NIS
studies simply assumed that institutional environments were tightly
coupled, meaning they exhibited "clearly legitimated organizational
templates and highly articulated mechanisms (the state, professional
associations, regulatory agencies, and leading organizations) for transmitting those templates to organizations.' 157 It is now clear that organizational fields vary by how well they are defined, what kinds of
(potentially inconsistent) pressures they are subjected to, the strength
of any networks of regulatory bodies that operate on them, and how
open they are to the influence of other fields. 158
Greenwood and Hinings add elements of a commons' internal
dynamics, such as interest dissatisfaction, value commitments, power
dependencies, and capacity for action, to the above exogenous factors. 1 59 In order to appreciate "the mechanics of innovation con-

texts," 60 we should build on their understanding of how cultural
commons "adopt and discard templates for organizing" given the na15See id. at 704-08 (adopting a threefold distinction between an institution's ideals,
discourse, and techniques of control so as to analyze and deconstruct the process of
institutionalization).

154

See id. at 706-08.
See Greenwood & Hinings, supra note 136, at 1032 (emphasis omitted).
156
Seeid. at 1031.
157
Id. at 1029.
158
See id. at 1029-30.
159
See id. at 1032-33 (contending that these "endogenous dynamics" contribute to an
understanding of how institutionalized practices change over time).
160
Madison et al., supra note 24, at 365.
155
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ture of their institutional environment. 16 1 Specifically, Greenwood
and Hinings hypothesize when institutional context will facilitate or
disrupt collective action within an organization. For example, network position plays a role in this dynamic:
[O]rganizations that are centrally located within an institutional
context may be less likely to develop the specialties and competencies of an alternative archetype. Peripheral organizations, in contrast, may develop these competencies because they are less fully
socialized by the context. In this sense, the institutional context can

act to limit the development of capacities for action in some but not
all organizations. However, the context itself might fundamentally
shift and articulate a new template .... In this scenario, the institutional context serves to articulate the need for new competencies
162
and promotes the development of capacities for action.
Networks can help us capture the mechanisms through which institutions enter and become embedded in a cultural commons. 163 To
see how, we can think about the contradictions that arise as this process takes place. There are several sources of tension when an institution lodges within a university or patent pool and subsequently guides
the behavior of its members and agents. 164 For example, rules and
roles, which are categorical, are adopted in ways that conflict with
technical demands that call for a more continuous array of solutions.
Thus, adopting certain practices in order to gain legitimacy in the
165
eyes of an institutional environment can undermine efficiency.
Second, as a commons imports institutions, they encourage individuals to process information in ways that they will not want to give up
later. Shared expectations become resistant to change. Even though
isomorphism might begin as an adaptive effort within a cultural com161
See Greenwood & Hinings, supra note 136, at 1041 (proposing that the study of
these processes helps to "bridge [the] gap" between old and new institutionalism).
162
Id.
163
DiMaggio and Powell describe this process, which in social theory is referred to as
"structuration," as involving four parts: "an increase in the extent of interaction among
organizations in the field; the emergence of sharply defined interorganizational structures
of domination and patterns of coalition; an increase in the information load with which
organizations in a field must contend; and the development of a mutual awareness among
participants in a set of organizations that they are involved in a common enterprise."
DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 135, at 148.
164
See Myeong-Gu Seo & W.E. Douglas Creed, Institutional Contradictions,Praxis, and
Institutional Change: A DialecticalPerspective,27 AcAD. MGMT. Rav. 222, 222-26 (2002) (defining a set of internal institutional contradictions that "drives, enables, and constrains
further institutional change"); see also Christine Oliver, The Antecedents of Deinstitutionalization, 13 ORG. STUD. 563, 566-79 (1992) (adopting a "deinstitutionalization" perspective to
explore the political, economic, and social factors that explain changes in an organization's institutional structure).
165
See Seo & Creed, supra note 164, at 226-27 (noting that conformity to institutional
arrangements may conflict with "technical activities and efficiency demands").
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mons, it can reduce adaptability in the long run. 166 Third, conformity
to a new institution leads to incompatibilities with practices that are
already established within a commons. 167 Finally, adopting institutions such as a new university budget category leads to conflicts
among divergent interests.168
These sources of contradiction suggest that the adoption of institutions is a matter of degree, and that network effects can influence
this process. To find out whether an institution is prone to persistence or change within a cultural commons, it would help to learn
about the position of actors within the commons and the kinds and
degrees of connections these actors share with others. 69 Network indicators can tell us about the strength of ties, levels of structural autonomy, interconnectedness, and other indicators of the durability of
institutions and opportunities for "entrepreneurs" to mobilize against
them. 7 0 Myeong-Gu Seo and W.E. Douglas Creed offer their own
propositions for how the above contradictions, alone or in combina171
tion, can encourage collective action for institutional change.
Their hypotheses deserve consideration when crafting historical, ethnographic, sociometric, or other accounts of cultural commons.
C.

Constructing the Cultural Commons

To the recursive interaction of human agency and structure, we
can add an innovation that mirrors Madison et al.'s final corrective to
the LAD framework. We can look to, in their words, "the construction
and evolution of meaning in the system, as reflected in symbol and
narrative." 72 Through this adjustment, we see hints of the struggle
between objectivist and subjectivist accounts that appeared in institutionalist scholarship for decades. Bourdieu argues that social theory
166 See id. at 227-28 (explaining how following the initial process of institutionalization, institutions become "locked in" and isolated from changes in their external
environments).
167 See id. at 228-29 ("[C]onformity to certain institutional arrangements . . . may
cause conflicts or inconsistencies with the institutional arrangements of different levels or
sectors.").
168
See id. at 229; see also Steven Brint & Jerome Karabel, InstitutionalOrigins and Transformations: The Case ofAmerican Community Colleges, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 20, at 337, 345-52 (analyzing the role of institutional power

structures and elite administrators in transforming the focus of American community colleges from liberal arts to vocational training); Mark A. Covaleski & Mark W. Dirsmith, An
InstitutionalPerspective on the Rise, Social Transformation, and Fall of a University Budget Category, 33 ADMIN. Sc. Q. 562, 576-83 (1988) (studying the organizational and external interests that influence a public university's adoption of budgetary policies).
169 See Hirsch & Lounsbury, supra note 58, at 416 (suggesting actors' positions within a
commons and the connections they share as one of three possible solutions to determine
"threshold points where institutions take hold or break down").
170
Seo & Creed, supra note 164, at 236-37.
171
See id. at 231-39.
172
See Madison et al., supra note 2, at 673.
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must find a way to combine "into a single model the analysis of the
experience of social agents and the analysis of the objective structures
that make this experience possible." 173 This is the dialectical relationship to which Madison et al. allude.
Bourdieu and NIS scholars share an interest in the systems of
meaning that form the "mediating link in the structure/agency relationship," where "an individual's position in a structure" influences
1 74
their "interpretive practices, meaning, and action at the local level."
This underscores a key comparison between the LAD framework and
other institutionalist approaches: each views different kinds of institutions as central to its analysis. I have discussed how Ostrom's original
framework and NIE emphasize regulative concerns, such as rules,
monitoring, and sanctioning. 175 While it is not always clear how regulative institutions such as rules develop in the first place, rational
choice provides a robust account of how they affect the cost-benefit
assessments of individual actors. Ostrom and some NIE scholars such
as Douglass C. North also rely on normative institutions. 176 Norms,
once established, encourage the creation of new roles, or the kinds of
actions that are considered appropriate in a given setting. 177 NIS
scholars expand the list to include a third category: cognitive institutions. 178 Here is where, in the words of Peter L. Berger and Thomas
Luckmann, institutions are "brought to life" as meanings attach to various actions and situations.' 79 One mechanism by which this occurs
involves the use of categories. 80° As we interact, we take our subjective
experiences and "subsume [them] under general orders of meaning"' 8 ' by creating categories for the various ideas, objects, events, and
actors involved.' 8 2 With the help of categories we are able to take
meaningful action in a particular setting.
Together, cognitive and normative institutions are crucial to the
social construction of a commons, including the actors involved and
technologies they employ. They shape the roles of actors, categories
of behavior, and meanings that actors attach to themselves and their
Bourdieu, supra note 15, at 782.
Diane Vaughan, Rational Choice, Situated Action, and the Social Control of Organizations,
32 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 23, 31 (1998).
175
See supra Part 1.
See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
176
173

174

PERFORMANCE

3, 27, 57 (1990).

177 See W. RICHARD SCOTT, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS: IDEAS AND INTERESTS
54-56 (3d ed. 2008).
178
See id. at 56-58.
179
See PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY.

A

TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE
SCOTT, supra note 177, at 64-65.
180

75 (1966).

supra note 179, at 39.

181

BERGER & LUCKMANN,

182

See SCOTT, supra note 177, at 41-42.
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interactions with others. And they suggest that choice is dictated by
more than internal motivations or cost-benefit assessments. Madison
et al.'s depiction of social construction hints at but does not sufficiently embrace the role of cognitive institutions.18 3 The authors describe cultural commons as having certain essential qualities, such as
"the way in which [they] allocate [ ] resources as they are produced
dynamically" and their unique "combination [s] of legal rules and
other 'openness' constructions propose[d] to solve [collective action
and other problems] ."184 This language reflects a focus on purposeful
design as opposed to what are often the unintended consequences of
cognitive institutions. The authors continue: "Understanding the
construction of cultural commons . . . requires understanding the
mechanisms by which resources are provisioned to the commons,
whether via legal entitlements or otherwise, and the nature of entitlements to use and consume those resources while they are part of that
commons. " 185 Their suggestion that we look to the "creation narrative" of a commons is helpful in that it directs attention to contextual
variables that are missing from institutional rational choice.18 6 However, their creation narratives seem to focus on the influence of overt
struggles within a resource pool ("the influence of power, politics, and
personalities" 187 ) that were at the heart of old institutionalist works. A
broader array of institutions generates the shared meanings that
guide daily interactions and decision making within cultural
commons.
Broadening the kinds of institutions that we study will help us
capture and critically evaluate the evolution of meaning within a commons. But we should also adopt a constructivist approach that reflects
the unique importance of technology in cultural commons. The first
two methodological shifts that I propose, viewing agency as embedded
within a social structure and treating the interaction of structure and
agency as a recursive process, suggest how we can document the social
construction of cultural commons.
There is a rich tradition of research regarding how technology is
not just invented and produced, but shaped through interaction. An
earlier focus concerned how interactions stabilize the meaning of a
technology or inscribe it with various interests that are expressed
through later use.' 8 8 Other scholars criticized these studies for their
183
See Madison et al., supra note 2, at 679-81 (asking to what extent certain attributes
of a commons are "inscribed in social norms or other social or cultural structures").
184
Id. at 700, 706.
185
Id. at 700.
186
Id. at 698-99.
187
Id. at 699.
188 See, e.g., TrevorJ. Pinch & Wiebe E. Bijker, The Social Constructionof Facts and Artifacts: Or How the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each Other, in
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determinism and for assuming that technology develops only until it
reaches a certain endpoint. More recently, Wanda Orlikowski developed a way to analyze the social construction of technology that not
only builds on the recursive interaction of agency and structure, but
accounts for both normative and cognitive influences.18 9 She explains
how the standard definition of technology-as-artifact ("the bundle of
material and symbol properties packaged in some socially recognizable form") is distinguishable from "technology-in-practice":
While a technology can be seen to have been constructed with
particular materials and inscribed with developers' assumptions and
knowledge about the world at a point in time, it is only when this
technology is used in recurrent social practices that it can be said to
structure users' actions. That is, it is only when repeatedly drawn on
in use that technological properties become constituted by users as
particular rules and resources that shape their action.19 0

This shift from having technology simply embody or move inexorably toward a social structure to a more interactive approach suggests
the prescience of Ostrom's concern for patterns of interaction and
their usefulness in depicting cultural commons. Orlikowski's work is
part of a trend in organization theory that focuses on the process of
continually evolving organizational forms as opposed to forms that we
merely assume to persist. 19 1 According to her technology-in-practice
lens, enactment proceeds in the following way:
[U]se of the technology involves a repeatedly experienced, personally ordered and edited version of the technological artifact .
... When people use a technology, they draw on the properties
comprising the technological artifact-those provided by its constituent materiality, those inscribed by the designers, and those added
on by users through previous interactions (e.g., specific data content, customized features, or expanded software/hardware accesso-

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION

OF TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN

THE SOCIOL-

TECHNOLOGY 17, 40-44 (Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes & Trevor
J. Pinch eds., 1987) (describing the development of the modem bicycle to demonstrate
how social construction leads to the "stabilization" of different interpretations of technological advancements).
189 Wanda J. Orlikowski, Using Technology and Constituting Structures: A PracticeLens for
Studying Technology in Organizations, 11 ORG. Sci. 404, 407-21 (2000).
190 Id. at 408 (citation and footnote omitted).
191
See, e.g., KARL E. WEIC, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZING 1 (1969) ("Organizations and their environments change so rapidly that it is unrealistic to show what they are
like now .... ."); Stephen R. Barley, Technology as an Occasionfor Structuring:Evidence from
Observationsof CT Scanners and the Social Orderof Radiology Departnents, 31 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 78,
100 (1986) (describing the evolution of role structures in a community hospital); Stephen
R. Barley, Technology, Power, and the Social Organizationof Work: Towards a PragmaticTheory of
Shilling and Deskilling, 6 REs. Soc. ORG. 33, 44 (1988) (giving examples of the effects of the
introduction of new technologies into an organization).
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ties). People also draw on their skills, power, knowledge,
assumptions, and expectations about the technology and its use, influenced typically by training, communication, and previous experiences. These include the meanings and attachments-emotional
and intellectual-that users associate with particular technologies
and their uses, shaped by their experiences with various technologies and their participation in a range of social and political
92
communities.1
Orlikowski equates technologies-in-practice with structure and
the ongoing use of technology with agency.193 The recursive interaction between the two is mediated by interpretive schemes (e.g., a prevailing view on how the technology can speed up existing tasks),
norms (e.g., a norm that dictates that "tools are best designed collaboratively"), and facilities (e.g., database customization, discussion
databases). 94 In one study, she follows several companies' use of Lotus Notes to show that this class of groupware can, when mediated by
different arrangements of facilities, norms, and interpretive schemes,
lead to a range of very different technologies-in-practice. 19 5 Enacted
versions of Notes included "collaborative," "collective problem-solving," "limited use," "individual productivity," "process support," and
19 6
"improvisation" forms.
Adopting Orlikowski's approach would lead to a better understanding of the kinds of technology enactment that take place in cultural commons and how "specific properties of technologies in
specific interpretive and institutional contexts" can lead to more cooperative development of intellectual property. 19 7 For example, the
original technology-in-practice version of Lotus Notes (as developed
by a firm financed by Lotus Development Corporation) focused on
collaboration and distributed control.' 98 Yet for one group of users, a
different set of interpretive schemes and the use of certain facilities
(e.g., e-mail and discussion databases) but not others (e.g., text entry
and edit, database customization) led to a technology-in-practice that
furthered only individual productivity goals.' 99
Orlikowski's framework provides one way to capture the patterns
of interaction that socially construct technology and other innovations
within a cultural commons. Brian Pentland and Martha Feldman provide another, which follows some of the principles of actor-network
192
t93

Orlikowski, supra note 189, at 408, 410 (citation omitted).
Id. at 410 fig.2.

194
195

Id. at 414-21 & fig.3.
See id. at 413-21.

196

Id.

197
198
199

Id. at 423.
See id. at 413.
See id. at 417-18.
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theory. 20 0 Of particular use for the study of cultural commons, proponents of actor-network theory argue that networks are not limited to
the characteristics of social relations such as the density or strength of
ties. 20 1 From a social-constructivist perspective, networks represent interactions among individuals and material, including technological artifacts. 20 2 Actor-network theory provides a constructivist approach to
how agents and artifacts interact, taking neither as determinative of
the other.20 3 Each is a social construction resulting from interactions
between social and material elements:
If human beings form a social network, it is not because they interact with other human beings. It is because they interact with human
beings and endless other materials too. And, just as human beings
have their preferences-they prefer to interact in certain ways
rather than in others-so too do the other materials that make up
the heterogeneous networks of the social. Machines, architectures,
clothes, texts-all contribute to the patterning of the social.
And... if these materials were to disappear then so too would what
we sometimes call the social order....
This, then, is the core of the actor-network approach: a concern with how actors and organizations mobilize, juxtapose, and
hold together the bits and pieces out of which they are
composed .... 204
Madison et al. describe a number of arrangements within cultural
commons that we could study as actor-networks, such as the archives,
libraries, and schools nested within a university. 20 5 As we investigate
the influence of institutions in a cultural commons, we should account for the heterogeneous nature of the networks through which
commons are constructed, which include human beings as well as the
technologies and architectures with which they interact. Pentland
and Feldman's work provides one approach to carrying this out.
Pentland and Feldman respond to a concern in actor-network
theory over how to integrate social and material aspects of a network
without falling victim to determinism in either direction. They do so
by adopting a tool that Madison et al. identify as important to setting
Brian T. Pentland & Martha S. Feldman, Narrative Networks: Patterns of Technology
and Organization, 18 ORG. Sci. 781, 786 (2007).
201
See infta note 204 and accompanying text.
202 Nathalie A. Steins & Victoria M. Edwards, Collective Action in Common-Pool Resource
Management: The Contributionof a Social ConstructivistPerspectiveto Existing Theory, 12 Soc'v &
NAT. RESOURCES 539, 544 (1999).
203 John Law, Notes on the Theory of the Actor-Network: Ordering,Strategy, and Heterogeneity,
5 Svs. PRAc. 379, 383 (1992).
204 Id. at 382, 386.
205
Madison et al., supra note 24, at 391-93.
200
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forth the history of a cultural commons: the narrative. 20 6 Specifically,
Pentland and Feldman construct "narrative networks" from: the actors, which are both human and material and referred to collectively
as "actants" in actor-network theory; narrative fragments, consisting of
"at least two actants and some kind of action that occurs with them or
between them"; and sequences of fragments that unity of action or
purpose hold together.20 7 As opposed to a purely social network
where nodes represent individuals, narrative fragments represent
nodes in Pentland and Feldman's approach. 208 These nodes and the
sequential ties that connect them are represented graphically, as in
the authors' representation of a network for purchasing an airline
20 9
ticket on the Internet.
Narrative networks offer a means of analyzing ethnographic, archival, and other data about cultural commons. As with Orlikowski's
technology-in-practice approach, narrative networks can help us explain why certain arrangements of social and technical actors stabilize
over time (e.g., through the isolation of certain nodes from others) or
are prone to change (e.g., through the substitution of one narrative
fragment for another).210 Each approach understands social construction to involve the interaction of multiple and divergent actors,
goals, and materials that can yield unexpected results. As with the
treatments of agency and structure that I introduced in the previous
subpart, 2 1 each approach accounts for the micropolitics of change,
path dependence, and other dynamics that would be missing from
more functionalist approaches to cultural commons. Furthermore,
they allow the researcher to hold objectivist and subjectivist accounts
in dialectical relation and to focus on how meanings attach to technologies as they interact with other elements of a network. When we
study how technologies that are developed in patent pools, open
source projects, and other initiatives can stabilize or change over time
and facilitate a range of collaborative and individualized forms of
problem solving, we will add another level of granularity to the study
of cultural commons.
CONCLUSION

The LAD framework followed Ostrom's efforts to show that selfgoverning institutions can exist in settings where collective action
problems, such as credible commitment and mutual monitoring,
206 See Madison et al., supra note 24, at 374; Pentland & Feldman, supra note 200, at
787-90.
207 Pentland & Feldman, supra note 200, at 787-90.
208
Id. at 788 tbl.1.
209 Id. at 789 fig.I.
210 See id. at 792.
211
See supra Part II.B.
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would appear to stand in their way. Few have done more to advance
the study and in particular the field research of institutions, which
Ostrom defined as "working rules" in recognition of the old institutionalists. 212 No approach offers more insight into the structure of a
common-pool resource or its management. Madison et al. display
good instincts in turning to the framework and refining it with the
goal of teasing out the attributes of "successful and sustainable cultural-commons regimes." 213 But beyond Ostrom's considerable descriptive endeavor and rebuke of "thin" rational choice arguments
such as the tragedy of the commons lies a more difficult and as yet
2 14
unfinished enterprise: the study of institutional change.
This Response points out some of the hazards of adapting Ostrom's approach to the study of cultural commons. I suggest that the
challenges that Madison et al. identify-avoiding functionalist explanations, attending to the dynamic nature of commons creation, and
acknowledging the role of narrative in shaping knowledge creation
and use-can be met by embracing and updating Ostrom's concern
for institutional change. I offer a few modest suggestions for how to
accomplish this task. Each views the creation of a cultural commons
as an institutionalization process and defines "institution" to include
regulative, normative, and cognitive elements. Each adopts a holistic
approach to human agency (of importance to early economic institutionalists) that situates an individual or commons within a broader
network of influences or institutional environment. And each defines
change as the recursive interaction of agency and structure (borrowing from attempts to bridge old and new institutionalist sociology),
highlighting key elements of Ostrom's framework: attention to
change on multiple levels and focus on patterns of interaction. We
can detect the level of influence of institutions and the contradictions
that they introduce at multiple levels of a cultural commons. And it is
through patterns of interaction that institutions are adopted, reproduced, internalized, questioned, and discarded or replaced.
Building on these assumptions, we can ask some of the more difficult questions of cultural commons. How do cultural commons adopt
and discard a broad range of templates for organizing? How do the
characteristics of an organizational field influence a commons' capacity for innovation? What contradictions emerge when an institution is
lodged within a commons and begins to guide the behavior of its
members? How do those contradictions, alone or in combination, encourage collective action for change? How do actors initiate change
when their institutional environment determines their behavior?
212
213
214

See Osmo,, supra note 28, at 51.
Madison et al., supra note 2, at 689.
See Osraom, supra note 28, at 2-3.
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How does one's position within a commons influence interpretive
practices, meaning, and action at the local level? How do arrangements of social and technical actors change or stabilize over time?
And how does interpretive and institutional context encourage cooperative technologies-in-practice? Asking such questions of cultural
commons will help bridge the enduring chasms that lie between the
old and new institutionalisms. How well each effort fits within Ostrom's broader framework is a conversation that we should have and
that I am excited to join.

